Despite demands by the United Nations for a timetable for the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty, the Iraqi governing council is warning it may take a year to finalise a constitution. There is no quick fix. Pressure to move quickly could delay progress by exacerbating conflict and undermining consensus between Iraqis.

The US state department set up its Future of Iraq project to assist postwar planning. The democratic principles working group, on which I acted as adviser to Iraqi opposition figures, foresaw many of the current problems, including whether Iraq will be a secular or religious state, choosing between a presidential or parliamentary system, and the role of federalism.

At the 1992 Salahuddin conference, the Iraqi opposition made a commitment to power-sharing via a federal parliamentary system. Federalism has since underpinned plans to harmonise the competing claims of Iraq's ethnic and religious communities. Some proponents of geographic federalism envisage a Kurdish majority entity in the north, an Arab Shia state in the south and a mixed Shia and Sunni state in central Iraq. This arrangement is preferred by Kurds, who would abandon their dream of independence only in exchange for a federal system allowing maximum autonomy. In the 1990s, Kurds made the most of US and UK security guarantees and achieved de facto independence. As America's wartime allies, Kurds expect at least as much self-rule as before the war.

Critics claim federalism would exacerbate ethnic and religious divisions and could lead to the break-up of Iraq. Some propose asymmetric federalism, with more powers allocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. Others argue this would accelerate fragmentation.

Satisfying the desires of ethnic minorities, such as Iraqi Turkmen and Assyrians, is proving especially difficult. Though most Iraqi Turkmen backed federalism, some now support a centralised system of governance. Turkmen object to minority status in Iraqi Kurdistan and, if Iraq does become a federal state, would probably seek a federal state of their own. Turkmen strongly resist plans to make Kirkuk the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, insisting it is their own historic capital. Their position is supported by Turkey, which has been accused of plotting the assassination of leading Kurdish politicians.

Turkmen are also wary of Kurds controlling Kirkuk's rich oil reserves. To tackle concerns that Kurdish control of the oilfields would create an incentive for statehood, Kurdish leaders have proposed central government control of Iraq's energy industry with proceeds distributed to the regions based on a negotiated formula. To mitigate conflict, the constitution must distribute revenues so that all Iraqis benefit from the country's vast energy wealth.

Religion is another hot topic. While the 1925 constitution acknowledged that most Iraqis are Muslim, it preserved freedom of worship. Radical Shia clerics, such as Moktadar al-Sadr, have rejected America's role in stewarding Iraq's constitution-making and demand that Sharia be enshrined as the law of the land.

More moderate Shia leaders are prepared to work with the coalition. They expect the US commitment to democracy will ultimately translate into an electoral outcome empowering Iraq's Shia majority.

The Bush administration faces a conundrum. On the one hand, it seeks to restore Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible. On the other, it wants to make sure Iraq's future leaders safeguard US interests. Before the war, Pentagon civilians envisaged Iraq's secular democracy as a springboard for transforming the Middle East. However, creating a secure environment for Iraq's democratic development is proving difficult. Liberation has unleashed forces that even America's mighty military cannot control.

Iraqis are a proud people determined to exercise their right to self-determination. Manipulating the Iraqi-led process could undermine the constitution's legitimacy and delay national elections. It could also strain relations between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the governing council that would, in turn, impede the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis.

The Coalition Provisional Authority must be patient. It can help by co-ordinating contributions from the international community, which has useful experience consolidating democracy in war-torn countries.

The writer is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Centre for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations